Logic of Local Inference for Contextuality in Quantum Physics and Beyond by Kishida, Kohei
Logic of Local Inference for Contextuality in
Quantum Physics and Beyond∗
Kohei Kishida†
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom
Kohei.Kishida@cs.ox.ac.uk
Abstract
Contextuality in quantum physics provides a key resource for quantum information and computa-
tion. The topological approach in [Abramsky and Brandenburger, New J. Phys., 2011, Abramsky
et al., CSL 2015, 2015] characterizes contextuality as “global inconsistency” coupled with “local
consistency”, revealing it to be a phenomenon also found in many other fields. This has yielded a
logical method of detecting and proving the “global inconsistency” part of contextuality. Our goal
is to capture the other, “local consistency” part, which requires a novel approach to logic that is
sensitive to the topology of contexts. To achieve this, we formulate a logic of local inference by
using context-sensitive theories and models in regular categories. This provides a uniform frame-
work for local consistency, and lays a foundation for high-level methods of detecting, proving,
and moreover using contextuality as computational resource.
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1 Introduction
Quantum physics provides quantum computing with immense advantage over classical
computing. Among its non-classical properties, non-locality is known to be a basis for
quantum communication (see [19]). It is in fact a special case of a property called contextuality,
which recent studies [22, 10] suggest is an essential source of the computational power of
quantum computers. This motivates the search for structural, higher-level expressions of
contextuality that are independent of the formalism of quantum mechanics.
The conception of contextuality that originated in [11] exploits the structure of presheaf :
As was shown in [11], a certain type of contextuality of a quantum system amounts to the
absence of global sections from presheaves modelling the behaviors of the system. The recent,
“sheaf-theoretic” approach [3] expands this insight by viewing contextuality in more general
terms, as a matter of topology in data of measurements and outcomes: A wider range of
contextuality is then characterized as the “global inconsistency” of the “locally consistent”.
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This has on the one hand shown that contextual phenomena can be found in various other
fields such as relational database theory (see [1]), and on the other hand made it possible to
apply various tools – sheaf theory, cohomology, linear algebra, for instance – to contextuality.
One idea that has emerged is to formulate contextuality argument in logical terms [2]: One
describes a presheaf model using logical formulas, and proves its contextuality by deriving
contradiction from the formulas.
This method, however, only shows the global inconsistency of a given set of formulas; we
know them to be locally consistent only because they describe a locally consistent model
that is given. Nonetheless, when designing ways of exploiting contextuality, we may well
first obtain a set of formulas or a specification, and then check if there is a model satisfying
it. This requires a logic in which consistency means local consistency. The chief goal of
this paper is to deliver such a new logic of local inference. The two logics – one for global
inconsistency and the other for local consistency – together lay a foundation for high-level
logical methods of not only showing but also using contextuality as resource.
Section 2 reviews the sheaf approach to contextuality, which takes presheaves valued in
Sets. Then section 3 defines what we call “inchworm logic”, a novel logic of local inference
for contextual models. We formulate this on the basis of regular logic, since its vocabulary
captures the essence of local inference. Semantics is provided for this logic in section 4, where
we generalize Sets-valued presheaf models to ones valued in any regular category S. This
encompasses cases that prove useful and powerful in applications: E.g., presheaves of abelian
groups, R-modules, etc. serve the purpose of cohomology; indeed, Čech cohomology is used
to detect the contextuality of Sets-valued presheaves [2]. This paper gives a uniform way of
using S-valued presheaves directly as models of contextual logic.
2 Contextual Models
We first review the idea behind the formalism of [2], stressing that it applies to more settings
than just quantum ones. The idea captures contextuality as a matter of topological nature,
which we illustrate with a simplicial formulation equivalent to the presheaf formulation of [2].
We also present a modification of the latter that can readily be generalized in section 4.
2.1 Topological Models for Contextuality
The formalism of [3] concerns variables and values in general. Their bare-bones structure
consists of a set X of variables and, for each x ∈ X, a set Ax of possible values of x. So we
have an X-indexed family of sets Ax. This can model various settings in which we make
queries against a system and it answers, as observed in [1, 2]; e.g.,
We measure properties x ∈ X of a physical system and it gives back outcomes a ∈ Ax.
A relational database has attributes x ∈ X, and a ∈ Ax are possible data values for x.
x ∈ X are sentences of propositional logic and a set of models assign to them boolean
values a ∈ Ax = 2. Or x ∈ X may simply be boolean variables.
We often make a query regarding several variables in combination; a set U ⊆ X of variables
the query concerns forms a context in which the system gives back a result. Contexts play
essential rôles in the following two kinds of constraints, (a) on answers and (b) on queries.
(a) When we make a query in a context U , the system returns (one or a set of) tuples
s ∈ ∏x∈U Ax of values. It then has the subset AU ⊆ ∏x∈U Ax of “admissible” tuples that
can be part of query results, and it is often the information on AU that we want. E.g.,
From a relational database we retrieve data with an attribute list U , and the database
returns the relation AU on sets Ax (x ∈ U) as a table.
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Given a set of models and a set U of sentences, AU is the set of combinations of values
that U can take; e.g., a pair ϕ,¬ϕ ∈ U only take values (1, 0) or (0, 1).
We may measure a physical system in various states and find that some set U of quantities
always satisfy a certain equation that characterizes AU .
(A tuple s ∈∏x∈U Ax is a dependent function, so it is formally a set of the form { (x, s(x)) |
x ∈ U and s(x) ∈ Ax }; but we may refer to it as “(s(x), s(y), . . . ) over (x, y, . . . )”.)
(b) We have the family C ⊆ PX of contexts in which queries can be made and answered.
We may not be able to make a query in a context V ⊆ X (i.e. V /∈ C) for reasons such as:
V may have too many variables to deal with feasibly.
A database schema may have no table encompassing all the attributes in V .
Quantum mechanics may deem it impossible to measure all the properties in V at once.
In these examples, if queries can be made in a context U , they can be in any V ⊆ U ; we
also assume that queries can be made in {x} for any x ∈ X, but only in finite U . So C is
an (abstract) simplicial complex on X, i.e. a ⊆-downward closed subfamily of PfinX with⋃
U∈C U = X. Also, if a tuple s of values is admissible, so is any t ⊆ s. Hence, whenever
V ⊆ U ∈ C, the projection of tuples −|V :
∏
x∈U Ax →
∏
x∈V Ax :: s 7→ s|V restricts to
AV⊆U : AU → AV . Thus A : Cop → Sets forms a presheaf on the poset C.
In fact, A is a separated presheaf. Generally, for any subfamily C of PX closed under
binary intersection, whenever
⋃
i Ui = U ∈ C for Ui ∈ C, a presheaf P on C has the map
〈PUi⊆U 〉i : PU →
∏
i PUi :: s 7→ (s|Ui)i land in the set of matching families for (Ui)i,
Match(Ui)i,P = { (ti)i ∈
∏
i PUi | tj |Uj∩Uk = tk|Uj∩Uk for every pair j, k }.
Then P is called separated if each of these 〈PUi⊆U 〉i is injective, and a sheaf if each of
those 〈PUi⊆U 〉i : PU → Match(Ui)i,P is bijective (see [17]). Yet, on a simplicial complex C,
separated presheaves and sheaves have simpler descriptions:
I Fact 1. A presheaf P on a simplicial complex C is a sheaf iff PU =
∏
x∈U Px for all U ∈ C.
And P is separated iff it is a subpresheaf of a sheaf, i.e. iff PU ⊆
∏
x∈U Px for all U ∈ C.
This shows that our A above is a separated presheaf, but not generally a sheaf. So let us
write sPsh(C) for the full subcategory of SetsCop of separated presheaves. Note that every
sheaf F has F∅ = 1, a singleton. A separated presheaf P has P∅ = 1, too, unless it is the
empty presheaf U 7→ ∅, i.e. the model is inconsistent in every context (hence modelling, e.g.,
a physical system that never produces outcomes in any context of measurements).
2.2 Presheaves and Bundles
The constraints (a) and (b) above are, indeed, matters of topology; this idea will be useful in
subsection 2.3. Given a separated presheaf A as in subsection 2.1, its underlying family of
X-indexed sets (Ax)x∈X is equivalent to a set over X, viz. pi :
∑
x∈X Ax → X :: (x, a) 7→ x,
by SetsX ' Sets/X. The base X comes with a simplicial complex C, but so does∑x∈X Ax,
taking tuples s ∈ AU as simplices, i.e. A =
⋃
U∈C AU . And pi is a simplicial map, or a bundle
of simplicial complexes, since s ∈ AU ⊆ A implies pi[s] = U ∈ C. On the other hand, any
given bundle pi : A → C has a family of AU = { s ∈ A | pi[s] = U } and AV⊆U : s 7→ s|V .
A simplicial map pi : A → C is called non-degenerate if pi|s is injective for every s ∈ A.
Our pi above is non-degenerate, because every s ∈ AU is a local section of the bundle pi,
meaning s : U →∑x∈X Ax such that pi ◦ s = 1U . Let us write Simp and ndSimp for the
categories of simplicial maps and of non-degenerate ones, respectively. It is easy to check
that for every simplicial complex C, the slice category ndSimp/C is a full subcategory of
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Figure 1 Bundles for (c) the Hardy model and (d) the PR-box
Simp/C; i.e., it is the category of non-degenerate bundles and simplicial maps over C. Then,
extending SetsX ' Sets/X, the correspondence described above gives
I Fact 2. sPsh(C) ' ndSimp/C for any simplicial complex C.
So here is a topological reading of (a) and (b). Each U ∈ C is a local, small enough region
of the space X of variables. The topology on the space A of values then distinguishes those
tuples s ∈∏x∈U Ax in AU from the others and deems the former to be continuous sections.
We refer to objects of sPsh(C) and ndSimp/C interchangeably as topological models.
2.3 Contextuality in Physics, Databases, and More
Given a non-degenerate bundle pi : A → C over a simplicial complex C on X, consider a
global section of it, i.e. g ∈∏x∈X Ax such that g|U ∈ AU for all U ∈ C. It is an assignment
of values to all the variables that satisfies every constraint on combinations of values. E.g.,
in classical logic, the models are exactly the global sections; so the consistency of a sentence
x means that (x, 1) is part of a global section. Then, in the physical setting, it may seem
natural to similarly think of global sections g as states of the system, assigning values to
all the quantities – so, although we can only make a query locally in a context U ∈ C, the
system in a state g actually has a value g(x) assigned to every quantity x, and the answer we
receive in the context U is simply g|U . This assumption, that any section we observe is part
of a context-independent global section, holds not just in classical logic but also in classical
physics – but breaks down in quantum physics, precisely when contextuality arises.
Figure 1 shows “Bell-type” scenarios in which Alice and Bob measure properties of a
system, perhaps a quantum one. The base C expresses constraints of type (b) above: Alice
can make at most one of two measurements a1 and a2 at a time, so she chooses one; similarly
Bob chooses from b1 and b2 – so there are four possible combinations of measurements,
indicated by the four edges of C. Alice and Bob repeat measurements in different contexts,
and learn that each x ∈ X = {a1, a2, b1, b2} has two possible outcomes 0 and 1, but that
some combinations of outcomes are never obtained. A expresses these constraints, of type
(a), with edges indicating possible combinations. E.g., A of (c) deems every joint outcome of
(a1, b1) possible, with A{a1,b1} = 2× 2; but (0, 0) is not a possible joint outcome of (a2, b2).
The models in Figure 1 all violate the classical assumption above, and are examples of
I Definition 3 ([2]). A topological model is said to be logically contextual if not all of its
local sections extend to global ones, and strongly contextual if it has no global section at all.
(c) of Figure 1 represents an example of logical contextuality due to [9] that is realizable
in quantum physics. It has several global sections, e.g. the one marked in green; call it g. So,
when Alice and Bob measure (a1, b1) and observe (0, 0), the classical explanation is possible
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that the system was in the state g and had outcomes g(x) assigned to all the measurements
x ∈ X, and that Alice and Bob have simply retrieved that information on U . On the other
hand, the local section in red, (1, 1) over (a1, b1), does not extend to any global section. This
means that the classical explanation is simply impossible for this joint outcome. Furthermore,
the classical explanation is never possible in the strongly contextual (d). This model, called
the PR box [21], is not quantum-realizable (though it plays an important rôle in the quantum
information literature), but quantum physics exhibits many instances of strong contextuality.
The upshot is that contextuality consists in global inconsistency coupled with local consist-
ency: A section s ∈ AU is consistent locally, in the sense of satisfying the constraint on query
results in the context U , but it may be inconsistent globally, in the sense of contradicting all
the other constraints and thereby failing to extend to a global section.
The general definition of contextuality in terms of global sections can also be applied to
relational databases: Contextuality then corresponds exactly to the absence of a universal
relation [1]. In fact, the natural join ./U∈C AU = { g ∈
∏
x∈X Ax | g|U ∈ AU for all U ∈ C }
of relations AU (which is the largest of universal relations if there are any) is, simply by
definition, the set of global sections.
2.4 No-Signalling Principle
Not just there being local sections, local consistency involves more – viz. a constraint that is
called the no-signalling principle in the physical setting [7]. For a topological model A, it
amounts to the condition that every AU⊆V : AV → AU :: s 7→ s|U is a surjection.
An example violating no-signalling is (e) of Figure 1: A{b1}⊆{a2,b1} : A{a2,b1} → A{b1} is
not surjective. Suppose Alice and Bob make measurements, Bob chooses b1, and he observes
1, which is not in the image of A{b1}⊆{a2,b1}. This means that Bob has received the signal
from Alice (no matter how far away she may be!) that she has chosen a1 and not a2.
To see why no-signalling should be part of local consistency, regard A in (e) as representing
a relational database. It has tables A{a1,b1} and A{a2,b1}; but, when queried about the
attribute b1, they yield different results of projection, differing in whether 1 is in or not.
Thus, no-signalling means the consistency of projections (see [1]). Indeed, as we will see in
subsection 4.3, no-signalling means a sort of coherence of A as a semantic model of logic.
I Definition 4. We say that a separated presheaf A : Cop → Sets is no-signalling if it satisfies
(1), and that a non-degenerate bundle pi : A → C is no-signalling if it satisfies (2):
(1) Every AU⊆V : AV → AU is a surjection.
(2) If pi[s] ⊆ U for s ∈ A and U ∈ C, then there is some t ∈ A such that s ⊆ t and pi[t] = U .
Clearly, (1) and (2) coincide via sPsh(C) ' ndSimp/C. Hence their full subcategories
of no-signalling models are equivalent. Note that (1) or (2) implies AU 6= ∅ for all U ∈ C, if
A∅ 6= ∅. So, while the empty model is no-signalling, all the other, nonempty no-signalling
models (which are, essentially, the “empirical models” of [2]) are locally consistent.
3 Contextual Logics
3.1 Contextuality Argument: Logic of Global Inconsistency
Viewing AU as representing a constraint on assignments of values to variables x ∈ U , we
can describe a topological model A using formulas in contexts U ∈ C of variables. E.g., the
assignments of (0, 0) and (1, 1) to (x, y) satisfy the equation x⊕ y = 0, where ⊕ is for XOR,
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i.e. addition modulo 2; the assignments (0, 1) and (1, 0) satisfy x⊕ y = 1. Therefore the PR
box, (d) of Figure 1, satisfies the following set of equations:
a1 ⊕ b1 = 0, a1 ⊕ b2 = 0, a2 ⊕ b1 = 0, a2 ⊕ b2 = 1 (3)
These are in fact inconsistent: Their right-hand sides sum to 1, but the left to 0 regardless
of the values of variables (since each variable occurs twice). This is to say that no global
assignment of values satisfies all the constraints of AU , i.e., that A is strongly contextual.
A family of arguments of this sort, using XOR (or parity) equations, has been given to
show the strong contextuality of a range of quantum examples; the first instance in literature
was in [18] for the GHZ state [8]. This sort of so-called “all-vs-nothing argument” was
formalized and generalized in [2]. On the other hand, one may also adopt more expressive
languages, such as Boolean formulas, to express a wider range of constraints.
Formulas can also be used to show logical (and not strong) contextuality. E.g., the Hardy
model, (c) of Figure 1, satisfies the antecedents of
¬a1 ∨ ¬b2, ¬a2 ∨ ¬b1, a2 ∨ b2 ` ¬a1 ∨ ¬b1 (4)
but not the consequent, due to the contextual section (1, 1) over (a1, b1). This shows that
this local section can be part of no global assignment satisfying all the constraints.
Yet this kind of contextuality argument needs some reflection. The inconsistency of a
set Γ of formulas, Γ ` ⊥, does not mean that Γ has no model; in fact, the PR box, (d) of
Figure 1, satisfies all the equations in (3). In the same vein, the derivability Γ ` ϕ does not
mean that every model of Γ satisfies ϕ; the Hardy model (c) satisfies Γ but not ϕ of (4). So
the logic of ` here is not sound with respect to contextual models – indeed, that is the whole
point of the argument. Invalidating ` precisely means contextuality: Γ ` ⊥ really means that
no global section satisfies Γ; it is why any model of Γ has no global section. Γ ` ϕ means
that every global section satisfying Γ satisfies ϕ; it is why any model satisfying Γ but not ϕ
must have local sections (viz. ones not satisfying ϕ) that fail to extend to global sections.
In this sense, the logic of ` here is a “global logic” of global sections. We should then
note that this logic, by itself, says very little about local consistency. To see this, consider:
a1 ⊕ b1 = 0, a1 ⊕ b1 = 1 (5)
This set of equations is, like (3), inconsistent. It is, however, inconsistent not just globally
but also locally: Not only does no global section satisfy both equations, no local section over
the context {a1, b1} does; a model A satisfies (5) only if A{a1,b1} = ∅ (the physical system
can give no outcomes to the measurements a1, b1). Yet the global logic does not tell us
why (3) is locally consistent whereas (5) is not. Thus the kind of argument above is really a
“global-inconsistency argument”: It shows contextuality only because we already know the
formulas to be locally consistent, having obtained them as descriptions of some model.
3.2 “Inchworm Logic” of Local Inference
Γ ` ⊥ of (5) means local inconsistency over {a1, b1} since both equations in Γ are in the
context {a1, b1}. Turning Γ, ϕ ` ⊥ into the form of inference, if Γ, ϕ are in the context U ,
Γ ` ¬ϕ gives local entailment over U . E.g., the antecedents of a1 = 0, b1 = 0 ` a1 ⊕ b1 = 0
rule out all the sections over (a1, b1) except (0, 0), which satisfies the consequent.
Indeed, local inference can be carried out across different contexts, validly in no-signalling
models, subject to one constraint. To see this, expand the base C in Figure 1 from (f) of
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Figure 2 to (g), where the four triangles are in C – so a new experimenter, Charlie, can make
his measurement c along with Alice and Bob.
Now rewrite the locally consistent (3) in the inference form (6) (we replace x ⊕ y = 0
with simpler x = y) and compare it to (7):
a1 = b1, a1 = b2, a2 = b1 ` a2 = b2 (6)
a1 = b1, a1 = c, a2 = b1 ` a2 = c (7)
(7) is valid in no-signalling models, whereas (6) is not (the PR box is a countermodel, as it is
a model for (3)). The only difference is c replacing b2 – this tiny difference, however, enables
us to obtain (7) in the following two steps:
a1 = b1 a1 = c
U
b1 = c a2 = b1
Va2 = c
(8)
The first step is within the context U = {a1, b1, c}, hence valid locally: Every section over U
satisfying the antecedents satisfies the consequent. Similarly, the second step is valid within
V = {a2, b1, c}. The key aspect is that the formula in the middle, b1 = c, can be in the
context U ∩ V and so in U or in V . The upshot is that information gets passed on from a
larger context U to a smaller U ∩ V and then to another larger V – just like the locomotion
of an inchworm, if (h) of Figure 2 helps to visualize it. Crucially, the no-signalling property
is essential when the inchworm moves from a larger context to a smaller: E.g., the first step
of (8) concludes that every section over {a1, b1, c} satisfies b1 = c; but then, in the absence
of no-signalling, there may be a section over {b1, c} violating b1 = c without extending to
{a1, b1, c}. We will discuss the semantic rôle of no-signalling further in subsection 4.3.
3.3 Formalizing the Inchworm
We formalize and generalize the idea of “inchworm inference”. As in the example in subsec-
tion 3.2, an inchworm logic is obtained by constraining a global logic. We assume this logic
to be (at least) regular, i.e. to have >, ∧, and ∃, for the reasons explained shortly.
I Definition 5. Let L be a language of regular logic (or richer) whose variables include X.
For each x ∈ X, write Tx for the type of x, and then, for each x¯ ⊆ X, write Φx¯ for the set of
formulas in the context x¯ : Tx¯. Given a simplicial complex C on X, the C-contextual fragment
of L is ΦC =
⋃
U∈C ΦU . By a C-contextual language LC, we simply mean a pair of such L
and ΦC . Now let T be a regular theory in L given by an entailment relation ` (which is not
required to be binary). Then the inchworm fragment of ` in LC is the entailment relation
`C on ΦC defined inductively by the following. We write ΓU = Γ ∩ ΦU .
(9) Γ `C ϕ if there is U ∈ C such that ϕ ∈ ΦU and ΓU ` ϕ.
(10) If Γ `C ϕ and ∆, ϕ `C ψ then Γ,∆ `C ψ.
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(9) expresses the idea that ` within a single context is valid locally as well. In (10), note
that the first two instances of `C may be witnessed by different contexts. Observe also that
Γ `C ϕ entails Γ ` ϕ; thus `C is a fragment of `.
I Example 6. Let L have T as a basic type; 0, 1 be constants of type T ; and ⊕ be a function
symbol of type ⊕ : T × T → T . Let Tx = T for all x ∈ X. So, e.g., x : T, y : T | x⊕ y = 1
makes sense, and is in Φ{x,y}. This gives equations of the kind relevant to the examples in
subsection 3.1. Note that ΦC is a union. E.g., for (f) of Figure 2, ai = 0 is in Φ{ai} ⊆ ΦC for
both i = 1, 2, but a1 = 0 ∧ a2 = 0 is not in ΦC since {a1, a2} /∈ C.
We assume L to have > and ∧, so that pieces of information can be combined within
the same context. The inchworm moves from a smaller context U to a larger V via the
order embedding i : (ΦU ,`U ) ↪→ (ΦV ,`V ), and from V to U via the left adjoint ∃V \U of i.
Then ∃V \U a i means that, for any ϕ ∈ ΦV , ∃V \U . ϕ ∈ ΦU encapsulates all and only the
information that ϕ entails on U . We also have ∃V \U ◦ i ∼= 1, so a piece of information that
can be both about U and about V undergoes no change when carried across U and V .
4 Contextual Semantics in Regular Categories
Our definition of model using a sheaf generalizes by replacing Sets with any category S with
finite limits, since the base C is a simplicial complex. Yet, for the sake of no-signalling, we
moreover need S to be regular. References on regular categories and their categorical logic
include [20, 5, 12]. We then lay out how to model the inchworm logic in S.
4.1 Topological Models in Regular Categories
Let C be a simplicial complex on a set X, and S be a category with finite limits. By a
presheaf on C valued in S, we mean any contravariant functor P : Cop → S. Then the
definitions of separated presheaf and sheaf generalize straightforwardly to
I Definition 7. We say that an S-valued presheaf P on C is separated if the arrow 〈PUi⊆U 〉i :
PU →
∏
i PUi is monic whenever
⋃
i Ui = U , and a sheaf if, whenever
⋃
i Ui = U , 〈PUi⊆U 〉i is
an equalizer as follows, where pj :
∏
i PUi → PUj and pk :
∏
i PUi → PUk are the projections.
PU
∏
i PUi
∏
j,k PUj∩Uk
〈PUi⊆U 〉i 〈PUj∩Uk⊆Uj ◦ pj〉j,k
〈PUj∩Uk⊆Uk ◦ pk〉j,k
Again, every sheaf F has F∅ = 1, the terminal object of S, and every separated presheaf
P has P∅ 1. Also, for simpler descriptions, Fact 1 generalizes to
I Fact 8. An S-valued presheaf P on a simplicial complex C is a sheaf iff PU =
∏
x∈U Px
for all U ∈ C. And P is separated iff it is a subpresheaf of a sheaf, i.e. iff each 〈P{x}⊆U 〉x∈U :
PU →
∏
x∈U Px is monic, i.e. iff each PU is a relation in S on (Px)x∈U .
Next we define the no-signalling property for S-valued separated presheaves. In doing so,
we need to choose from several generalizations of the notion of surjection in (1) of Definition 4;
the one that serves our purpose is the one that provides semantics for ∃ : ΦV  ΦU : i in
the inchworm logic. This is the principal reason we need S to be regular; then, in S, every
arrow f : C → D gives rise to the adjoint pair ∃f a f−1, ∃f : SubS(C)  SubS(D) : f−1
(e.g. [5, Lemma 2.5]), and moreover ∃f ◦ f−1 = 1Sub(D) (and so f−1 is an order embedding)
if f is a regular epi (essentially, [12, Corollary D1.2.8]). Therefore the right generalization of
Definition 4 is the following Definition 9, with an alternative description in Fact 10.
K. Kishida 113:9
I Definition 9. A separated presheaf A on a simplicial complex C valued in a regular category
S is said to be no-signalling if every AU⊆V : AV → AU is a regular epi.
I Fact 10. Let F be a sheaf on a simplicial complex C. Then a family (iU : AU  FU )U∈C of
subobjects forms a subpresheaf of F , and hence a separated presheaf, iff AV 6 FU⊆V −1(AU ),
or equivalently ∃FU⊆V (AV ) 6 AU , whenever U ⊆ V ∈ C. Moreover, a separated presheaf
i : A F is no-signalling iff ∃FU⊆V (AV ) = AU whenever U ⊆ V ∈ C.
4.2 Global Inconsistency in Regular Categories
Definition 3 of contextuality for Sets-valued presheaves can now extend to ones valued in
any regular category S. Let A be an S-valued separated presheaf on a simplicial complex C
on X. It is a subpresheaf of a sheaf F on C. In fact, let us assume, just in this subsection,
that X is finite (or that S is complete); then, by Fact 8 (or a straightforward generalization),
F extends uniquely to a sheaf on PX, viz. F : U 7→∏x∈U Fx. Then the set of global sections
of A – i.e. the natural join ./A of the relations AU ⊆ FU – generalizes to the S-valued case:
I Fact 11. Given any S-valued separated presheaf A, let F be a sheaf such that i : A F
and, using AU as predicates in the internal language of S, define
./A = J x¯ : FX | ∧U∈C AU (FU⊆X x¯) K = ∧U∈C FU⊆X−1(AU ) FX .
Then ./A is the limit of A as a diagram in S.
For each U ∈ C, write ρU : ./A→ AU for the restriction of FU⊆X to ./A; it generalizes
the restriction of global sections to local sections over U . Definition 3 then extends to
I Definition 12. An S-valued separated presheaf A is said to be logically contextual if not
every ρU : ./A→ AU is a regular epi. A is moreover said to be strongly contextual if ./A is
not well-supported, i.e. if the unique arrow !./A : ./A→ 1 is not a regular epi.
Rewriting this in the internal language of S, the strong contextuality of A means that
S fails ∃x¯ : FX . ./A(x¯), i.e., that no global section x¯ satisfies all the constraints AU . The
logical contextuality means that x¯ : FV | AV (x¯) ` ∃y¯ : FX\V . ./A(〈x¯, y¯〉) fails in S for some
V ∈ C, i.e., that not every local section x¯ over V satisfying AV extends to a global section
〈x¯, y¯〉 satisfying all AU .
4.3 Contextual Interpretation
In Definition 5 we defined a contextual language LC and logic `C simply as a global language
L and logic ` paired with their contextual fragments. Our definition of an interpretation of
them in regular categories goes in parallel.
I Definition 13. Given a contextual language LC = (L,ΦC), an interpretation of it in a
regular category S is simply an interpretation J−K of L in S. The images of Tx and ΦU then
play special rôles: For each x¯ ∈ C, we haveJTx¯K = ∏x∈x¯JTxK; therefore JT−K : Cop → S forms a sheaf by Fact 8.
Moreover, J x¯ : Tx¯ | ϕ K JTx¯K for each ϕ ∈ Φx¯.
So we may write (J−K, F ) for the interpretation J−K, where F is the sheaf F : x¯ 7→ JTx¯K. We
may also write JϕKx¯ Fx¯ for J x¯ : Tx¯ | ϕ K.
I Example 14. Expanding Example 6, take J−K in Sets with JT K = 2 and the obvious J0K,J1K, and J⊕K. Then we have a sheaf JT−K : U 7→ 2U and, e.g., Jx : T, y : T | x⊕ y = 0 KJT{x,y}K = 2× 2 is an equalizer of J⊕K, J0K ◦ ! : 2× 2→ 2.
ICALP 2016
113:10 Logic of Local Inference for Contextuality in Quantum Physics and Beyond
An interpretation J−K of L is said to model a sequent Γ ` ϕ if some finite ∆ ⊆ Γ has∧
ψ∈∆JψKU 6 JϕKU . This makes sense whether U ∈ C or not. Nevertheless, if U /∈ C, then∧
ψ∈∆JψKU 6 JϕKU only means the global entailment and not the local one. Take, e.g.,
I Example 15. Expanding Example 14, the model A of the PR box, (d) of Figure 1, is a
subpresheaf of JT−K described by (3): E.g. A{ai,b1} = J a1 ⊕ b1 = 0 K{a1,b1}  2× 2. Then
the global inconsistency, and strong contextuality in particular, of the equations Γ in (3)
means ./A =
⋂
ϕ∈ΓJϕKX ⊆ J⊥KX = ∅. Yet Γ is locally consistent, modelled by the PR box.
This is why, to model the inchworm logic of local inference, we need a presheaf on different
contexts U ∈ C, as opposed to an intersection in a single context V /∈ C, to the left of 6.
I Definition 16. Suppose (J−K, F ) is an interpretation of a contextual language LC . Then
let us say that a subpresheaf A F is a pre-model in (J−K, F ) of a formula ϕ ∈ ΦU in a
context U ∈ C, and write A U ϕ, to mean that AU 6 JϕKU .
I Fact 17. If A 6 B for subpresheaves A and B of F , then B U ϕ implies A U ϕ.
Note, however, that this notion of pre-model is context-dependent and concerns formulas
in contexts as opposed to formulas per se. When U ⊆ V ∈ C and ϕ ∈ ΦU , Fact 10 yields
(11) A U ϕ entailsA V ϕ (because ∃FU⊆V (AV ) 6 AU 6 JϕKU entailsAV 6 FU⊆V −1JϕKU =JϕKV ).
(12) Suppose A is no-signalling. Then A V ϕ entails A U ϕ. (This is because AV 6JϕKV = FU⊆V −1JϕKU implies AU = ∃FU⊆V (AV ) 6 JϕKU .)
If A is not no-signalling, (12) may fail, and then inchworm inference fails. E.g., in (8), the
first step purports to show that, if A U a1 = b1 and A U a1 = c, then A U b1 = c and so
A U∩V b1 = c; but the “and so” step here requires (12). In this sense, no-signalling means
the context-independent coherence of a presheaf as a model of formulas. Therefore
I Definition 18. A pre-model A is called a (no-signalling) model if it is no-signalling. Then
we say that A is a model of a formula ϕ ∈ ΦC , and write A  ϕ, to mean that A is a pre-model
of ϕ in any suitable context, i.e., that AU 6 JϕKU for every U ∈ C such that ϕ ∈ ΦU .
I Theorem 19. Let J−K be an interpretation of LC that models a theory ` in L. Then the
inchworm logic `C of ` is sound with respect to the no-signalling models in J−K: If Γ `C ϕ,
then A  ϕ for every no-signalling model A of Γ in J−K.
4.4 The Inchworm and No-Signalling
Subsection 4.3 primarily concerned how given presheaves modelled formulas. We showed in
particular that no-signalling validated inchworm inference. Let us discuss, on the other hand,
how the description by given formulas yields a model. This shows the other direction of the
connection between no-signalling and the inchworm, from the latter to the former.
We say a set Γ ⊆ ΦC of formulas of LC is C-finite if ΓU is finite for each U ∈ C.
I Definition 20. Let (J−K, F ) be an interpretation of LC . Given any C-finite Γ ⊆ ΦC , define
MF (Γ) as a family (MF (Γ)U =
∧
ϕ∈ΓU JϕKU  FU )U∈C of subobjects of FU .
I Fact 21. MF (Γ) is the largest subpresheaf A of F such that A U ΓU for each U ∈ C.
MF (Γ) generally fails to be no-signalling (take the first step of (8) as an example again).
Yet the description by Γ sometimes manages to give a no-signalling MF (Γ).
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I Fact 22. Let (J−K, F ) be an interpretation of LC that models a theory ` in L. We say
Γ ⊆ ΦC is inchworm-saturated if ΓV ` ϕ implies ΓU ` ∃V \U . ϕ whenever U ⊆ V ∈ C and
ϕ ∈ ΦV . Now, if a C-finite Γ is inchworm-saturated, then MF (Γ) is no-signalling.
When Γ is inchworm-saturated, it may not be deductively closed, but the inchworm
cannot bring a new piece of information ψ to a context U from another V , since ψ follows
from the information ΓU that U already has. Fact 22 means that, if Γ is inchworm-saturated
and if each ΓU finite and consistent (and has MF (Γ)U nonempty or well-supported), then Γ is
locally consistent, modelled by a no-signalling model MF (Γ). E.g., (3) is inchworm-saturated,
with each context consistent, so it gives the PR box, (d) of Figure 1, as MF (Γ).
On the other hand, even when a description Γ is not inchworm-saturated and MF (Γ)
fails to be no-signalling, the inchworm can carve out the “no-signalling interior” of MF (Γ), if
Γ can be saturated in finite (or C-finite) steps.
I Theorem 23. Let (J−K, F ) be an interpretation of LC that models a theory ` in L. Given
Γ ⊆ ΦC, suppose there is a C-finite and inchworm-saturated ∆ ⊆ ΦC such that Γ ⊆ ∆ and
Γ `C ϕ for all ϕ ∈ ∆. Then MF (∆) is the largest no-signalling subpresheaf of MF (Γ).
E.g., A in (e) of Figure 1 is MF (Γ) given by Γ = {ϕ} for ϕ = (a2 ∧ ¬b1) ∨ (¬a2 ∧ ¬b1);
since ϕ cannot be in the context {b1}, Γ{b1} = ∅ and A{b1} = 2. Yet ϕ ` ¬b1, so Γ `C ¬b1,
and ∆ = Γ ∪ {¬b1} is inchworm-saturated, with ¬b1 ∈ ∆{b1}. Hence, by Theorem 23, the
inchworm carves out a no-signalling MF (∆) by removing the red sections from (e). Indeed,
in many applications (e.g. all the examples in sections 2 and 3), the theory ` satisfies
(13) Given any Γ ⊆ ΦC (that may not be C-finite), for each U ∈ C there is a finite ∆U ⊆ ΓU
such that ∆U ` ϕ for all ϕ ∈ ΓU .
This guarantees the supposition of Theorem 23: Given any C-finite Γ ⊆ ΦC, take its `C-
deductive closure Γ∗ = {ϕ | Γ `C ϕ } as Γ in (13) and obtain ∆U ; then ∆ = Γ ∪
⋃
U∈C ∆U is
such as in Theorem 23. Therefore Theorem 23 applies and leads to a family of completeness
results organized by Lemma 24, which transfers a completeness theorem of a global theory
to its inchworm fragment. It yields, e.g., Theorem 25, since any (global) regular theory has a
“conservative model” in a “classifying category” (e.g. [5, Proposition 6.4]).
I Lemma 24. Suppose that a theory ` in L satisfies (13), and that J−K is a conservative
model of `, meaning that, for any Γ ⊆ ΦC,
∧
ψ∈∆JψKU 6 JϕKU for some ∆ ⊆ Γ if but also
only if Γ ` ϕ. Then Γ `C ϕ iff A  ϕ for every no-signalling model A of Γ in J−K.
I Theorem 25. Let ` be a regular theory satisfying (13). Then, for any Γ ⊆ ΦC, Γ `C ϕ iff
A  ϕ for every no-signalling model A of Γ in every model J−K of ` in any regular category.
4.5 Completion for Completeness
Generally, (13) may fail and the inchworm saturation may not be attained in finite steps.
I Example 26. In Figure 1, replace each Ax = 2 with Z, and let Γ = { a1 = b2, b1 = a1, a2 =
b1, b2 = a2 + 1, b2 > 0 } in the obvious L and `. Then Γ `C a1 > 0, b1 > 0, a2 > 0, b2 >
1, . . . , x > n for every x ∈ X and n ∈ N, whereas Γ 0C ⊥ (although the empty presheaf is
the only no-signalling model of Γ). So there cannot be any such ∆ as in Theorem 23. (Note
that the topology of C is essential: E.g., if we take C = PX instead, then Γ `C ⊥ by Γ ` ⊥.)
Thus, even if Γ is finite, the set { JϕKU | ϕ ∈ Γ∗U } may have no minimum (though it is
lowerbounded by ∃FU⊆X (
∧
ψ∈ΓJψKX) if X is finite); then, in a regular category in general,∧
ϕ∈Γ∗U JϕKU may not exist. So, instead of the semilattice SubS(FU ) of subobjects, let us
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use a completion of it, viz. the semilattice Filt(SubS(FU )) of filters in SubS(FU ), and assign
a filter of subobjects, instead of a subobject, to each U ∈ C.
I Definition 27. Suppose (J−K, F ) is an interpretation of a contextual language LC . Then,
by a filter model in (J−K, F ), we mean a presheaf G : Cop → Sets such that
GU ∈ Filt(SubS(FU )) for every U ∈ C.
For U ⊆ V ∈ C, GU = {S  FU | FU⊆V −1(S) ∈ GV } = { ∃FU⊆V (S) FU | S ∈ GV },
so GU⊆V : GV → GU :: S 7→ ∃FU⊆V (S) is a surjection.
We say G models ϕ, and write G  ϕ, to mean that JϕKU ∈ GU whenever ϕ ∈ ΦU .
Then we have the filter versions of Theorem 19, Fact 22, and completeness results
organized by Lemma 24. Observe that every (no-signalling) model A is a “principal” filter
model, U 7→ ↑AU = {S  F | AU 6 S }; so Theorem 28 is stronger than Theorem 19.
I Theorem 28. Let J−K be a model of a theory ` in L. Then the inchworm logic `C of ` is
sound with respect to the filter models in J−K: If Γ `C ϕ, then G  ϕ for every filter model G
of Γ in J−K.
I Fact 29. Let (J−K, F ) be a model of a theory ` in L. Given any Γ ⊆ ΦC, the family
FMF (Γ) = ({S  FU | JϕKU 6 S for some ϕ ∈ Γ∗U })U∈C is a filter model of Γ in (J−K, F ).
Moreover, for any filter model G of Γ in (J−K, F ), FMF (Γ)U ⊆ GU for each U ∈ C.
I Lemma 30. Suppose J−K is a conservative model of a theory ` in L. Then Γ `C ϕ iff
G  ϕ for every filter model G of Γ in J−K.
5 Conclusion
Let us conclude the paper by discussing connections and applications between the framework
of this paper and other approaches or other fields as future work. First of all, categorical logic
has a long tradition (since [16]) of viewing local truth as a modal operator. Indeed, the logic
of local information in this paper is closely related to the dynamic-logical characterization of
contextuality in [13]. There is also a connection to model theory. For instance, the similarity
between inchworm inference and Craig interpolation should be obvious; indeed, by defining
ΦU more generally as a “language in the vocabulary U”, we can prove a stronger version
of Robinson’s joint consistency theorem (see [6, subsection 4.1.1]) that is sensitive to the
topology of C.
As explained in section 2, presheaf models can model Boolean valuations. This enables
us to transfer and apply techniques from satisfiability problems to quantum contextuality as
computational resource. Another connection is to the structure of valuation algebra, which
is used for local computation [14]. In fact, our presheaf models can also be formulated in
terms of valuation algebras, as a C-indexed family of valuations satisfying certain conditions.
We can expect these connections to help extend local computation to situations in classical
computing where contextual phenomena arise.
The generality of taking presheaves in regular categories is also expected to facilitate
applications. In cohomology, it is typical to use presheaves valued in regular categories, such
as presheaves of abelian groups, R-modules, etc. Therefore the framework of this paper
applies to the logic of local inference within such presheaves. One can also take regular
categories of structures that are used for other purposes such as modelling processes in
quantum physics. In addition, the connection to logical paradoxes [2] is also relevant. As
shown in [15, 4], regular categories provide background for self-referential and other fixpoint
paradoxes; so our formalism will unify the two perspectives on paradoxes.
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